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BARBARA BETCHERMAN

MEMORIAL LECTURE

A GENERATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
LOOKING BACK TO THE FUTURE©
BY

JUSTICE ROSALIE SILBERMAN ABELLA*

The author traces the development of human rights in
North America since the Second World War, and
examines the socio-political environment in which these
developments took place. In examining what appears
to be an existing backlash against the earlier vigorous
pursuit of rights for disadvantaged groups, the author
distinguishes between civil liberties and human rights,
and focuses on how a preoccupation with civil liberties
is impeding the ability to promote human rights. She
concludes by discussing the evolution of human rights
for women this generation, and observes that while
there have been significant gains, especially
numerically, there has also been increasing resistance
to further fundamental change.

L'auteure trace le d6veloppement des droits de
'homme en Am6rique du Nord depuis ]a Deuxi~me
Guerre mondiale, et examine l'atmosph~re sociopolitique dans laquelle ces d6veloppements ont eu lieu.
En examinant ce qui parait 6tre un choc en retour
centre ce que fut, au d6but, la poursuite vigoureuse des
droits en faveur des groupes d6savantag~s, l'auteure
d6montre comment la pr6occupation des droits
libertaires civiques fait obstacle a la capacit6 de la
promotion des droits de l'Homme. Elle conclut par
une discussion sur l'6volution des droits de l'Homme
pour les femmes de cette gdn6ration, et remarque que,
bien qu'il yait des gains substantiels r6aliss,surtout de
point de vue num6rique, il existe 6galement une
resistance croissante a tout changement fondamental.

Barbara Betcherman, the incandescent woman for whom this

lecture series is named, graduated from this law school almost twentyfive years ago. She burst onto the public scene just in time to help
navigate, motivate, and explicate the most energetic rights revision for
women in centuries. Looking ahead from her perch as a leader of the
rights parade, the future seemed inexorably welcoming; looking back
from the present, the rights parade ended a lot sooner than the marchers
hoped, a casualty of thinning crowds and unpopular floats.
Last winter, an article appeared in the Sunday New York Times
Magazine by Leon Higginbotham Jr.,1 an African-American with a
© 1998, The Hon. R. Silberman Abella
Justice of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, Canada. This is the Ninth Barbara Betcherman
Memorial Lecture, presented at Osgoode Hall Law School of York University on October 7, 1998.
1 A.L. Higginbotham Jr., "Breaking Thurgood Marshall's Promise" The New York Times

Magazine (18 January 1998) 28.
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distinguished forty-five year career as a lawyer, judge, and professor. He
wrote about how proud he felt fifty years ago watching Thurgood
Marshall argue before the United States Supreme Court, successfully as
it turned out, for the right of African-Americans to be admitted to an
all-White law school. 2 Less than half a century later, the judicial
beneficence of this ruling had turned into the sclerotic jurisprudence
that ended affirmative action measures in Texas and California law
schools 3 The result was that out of a total of 736 first year law students
4
at Berkeley and the University of Texas, only 5 were Blacks.
Higginbotham cites these statistics as introductory to the poignant
ending of his opening paragraph: "I sometimes feel as if I am watching
justice die."5
In 1990, when the United Nations held its first review of progress
since the end of the UN Decade for Women in 1985, it concluded: "The
entrenched resistance to women's advancement and the reduction of
resources available for change that has accompanied the world economic
situation in the late 1980s have meant that there has been a loss of
impetus and even stagnation in some areas where more progress would
have been expected." 6
Why has the concept of human rights appeared to move from its
early confident primacy in the justice picture, to the current defensive
margins of the canvas? What happened to the enthusiastic, gendercollaborative, media-supported, unabashedly idealistic and legislativelyendorsed human rights initiatives of the 1970s, those struggles to change
the. law of the family, to get more women into the work force, to close
the wage gap, to end occupational segregation, to increase child care,
and to facilitate the balance between work and family responsibilities?
Today, the wage gaps remain sturdily in place; occupational segregation
survives intact; child care, nowhere endorsed as a universally desirable
public policy, gets debated as if it were about maternal responsibilities
2 See Sweatt v. Painter,339 U.S. 629 (1950).
3 In Texas, see Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, requestfor rehearingen banc denied, 84 F.3d 720
(5th Cir. 1996). In California, see Coalitionfor Economic Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir.
1997), amended and superseded on denial of rehearing, 122 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 1997), amended on
denial of rehearing,as amended, stay denied, 122 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 1997), stay denied, 118 S. Ct. 17
(1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 397 (1997), on remand.
4 Higginbotham, supra note 1 at 28.
5

1bidL

6 Recommendations and Conclusions Arising from the First Review and Appraisal of the
Implementation of the NairobiFonvard-Looking Strategiesfor the Advancement of Women to the Year
2000, UN ESCOR, 1st Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 4, UN Doc. E/RES/1990/15 (1990) 26 at 27.
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and not about children's entitlement; and the work/family discussion has
captured the public's attention but not its interest. Anyone who believed
passionately in human rights, for women or anyone else, was, in the
1970s, called a moderate. Today, those same views are called radical.
In 1972, at the National Conference on the Law in Ottawa, then
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau committed this generation "to seek a
society which emphasizes human dignity in all its manifestations." 7 That
is the purpose of human rights, and that is the movie Barbara's
generation thought they had parts in. But somewhere along the way, the
projector was turned off. Obviously, somebody didn't like the plot.
No one opposes equality or human rights. But their definition
and application produce controversy of a fundamental kind. The
reasons for the remedial resistance are undoubtedly complex, but worth
exploring nonetheless to try to unplug the attitudes clogging the arteries
of progress-a progress we thought only a generation ago was
unstoppable.
I think there are two main dynamics directing the cultural
environment in North America today, and they are both worrying for
different reasons. The first is the New Puritanism and the second is the
New Pluralism. Both profoundly affect our capacity to create
ameliorating strategies and each offers explanations for strategic delays.
First, the New Puritanism or Fundamentalism. As far as I can
tell, the Old Fundamentalism was about religious orthodoxy and the
maintenance of clear distinctions between right and wrong, as
ecumenically declared. In their personal firmament, fundamentalists
found answers to most of life's tough calls and were spiritually content to
resist moral ambiguity.
As time went on, as is the case with many who feel they
categorically know the difference between right and wrong, there grew a
zeal to impose more universally the moral certainty puritanism
preached. By the 1950s, after decades of moral pluralism, exhausted and
wounded as we were by the horror and enormity of World War II,
puritanism as secular morality surfaced as a majority phenomenon. It
took the form of Dwight Eisenhower in the United States, Louis St.
Laurent in Canada, the suburbs, bungalows, 2.5 children per family, one
spouse per marriage, June Cleaver and her son Beaver, a station wagon,
and a matching dog. The essence of the movement was conformity and

7 The Rt. Hon. P.E. Trudeau, "Remarks by the Prime Minister to the Opening Session"

(National Conference on the Law, National Arts Centre, 1 February 1972) [official translation,
unpublished, archived at the National Library of Canada].
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The "truth" was obvious, compliance was

expected, and competitive truths and their adherents were squelched.
McCarthyism flourished in the name of this moral purity, and
decent people behaved unforgivably for years. The people who started
the movement were haters; their followers were naive or worse. Anyone
who resisted was labelled undemocratic, unpatriotic, Communist, or
Jewish-often interchangeable terms in those days. Careers were
ruined, injustices blatantly encouraged or not discouraged, horrendous
assumptions tacitly accepted, and all while the continent yawned and
stretched and felt proudly unified by the purity of its monolithic and
homogeneous morality.
Is it any wonder we had the turbulent sixties? Or the loquacious
seventies? Or the amoral eighties? Or the indifferent nineties? A
devastating World War shatters presumed civilities; the victims are
humanism and humanity; the need for spiritual catharsis creates a search
for purifiers; the purification that starts nobly at Nuremberg eventually
ends ignobly at the House Committee on Un-American Activities in
Washington; the purified parents of the fifties create predictably bored
progeny in the sixties; and a decade in the sixties is spent overreacting to
the overpurification and oversimplification of the fifties.
But the purification of the sixties created its own new tyrannical
truths-about adults over thirty and whether you could trust them, about
respectability, about rules, and about traditions generally. The only
thing that people raised in the fifties and those raised in the sixties had
in common was that each group thought they had a monopoly on truth.
And that's why we did so much talking in the seventies. We had
to try to figure out which value system was better, which side was right.
So we discussed the environment, women, minorities, disabled persons,
Aboriginal people, marriage, sex, sexual orientation, religion, children,
language, and education. We changed some laws and social norms, and
started to regroup. We sought refuge in like-minded people, battered as
we were by the increasing stridency of the national and local
conversations.
We also started to divide. By the time we finished talking to, or
at, each other in the seventies, we had no idea who was right and who
was wrong. There were no villains, but there seemed to be a lot of
victims, and we were utterly confused.
In the eighties, we fervently became one of three things:
conservatized, radicalized, or self-centred. And each side of the triangle
mocked the other two, claimed to represent a broad consensus, and
expressed cranky frustration with public institutions. We lost our
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compass-and our tolerance. We held each other under siege, but we
didn't know why we were giving ultimatums to each other.
And on top of all of this was imposed a Charterof Rights and
Freedoms.8 I am a serious Charter fan and I always have been. But I
think we have to be aware of what we coincidentally did by bringing in
the Charter when we did. On top of a cynicism about whether
democratically elected political institutions were properly accountable,
we imposed unelected, unaccountable jurists to decide whether rights
and freedoms no one understood, but everyone passionately believed in,
were being violated. On top of a debate about whether individual rights
or collective rights were supreme, we imposed a Charter that was
ideologically divided on the subject, and offered as a tool for brokering
the issue the great jurisprudential problem-solving concept found in
section 1: "It depends." On top of the public's relief that at last the
concept of human rights was constitutionally entrenched and therefore
supreme, we imposed a notwithstanding clause, assuring people that in
their own interests and for their own benefit, governments could
suspend their otherwise constitutionally-protected rights and freedoms
(but not, ironically, their constitutionally-protected division of powers).
And on top of a nation increasingly divided over how to unify whatever it
was that was holding it together, we imposed a unifying document that
seemed to protect everyone's right to stay diverse.
So people who drew their lines through the debates of the
seventies held tough and stayed tough through the eighties, comforted
by the notion that the lines had become rights, and that the rights had
been enshrined. Everyone, in short, began to claim a monopoly now not
only on truth, but on justice as well. The Charter,in short, gave voice to
the lines.
What could before have been labelled an individual's personal
and idiosyncratic point of view was now perceived by that individual as a
constitutionally-protectedpersonal and idiosyncratic point of view. When
individuals start to perceive that their points of view have constitutional
validity, they start to take those views and themselves very seriously.
And from there it's only a short leap to intolerance-the kind of
Pavlovian urge to impose your views on others and, more importantly, to
exude the fumes of moral absolutism, which fundamentalism exhales.
We were forgetting, it seems, that nothing, not even rights, is absolute,
and as a result we were losing our balance. So by the nineties we came
full circle, back to the puritanism of the fifties, only now there were
8 CanadianCharterof Rights andFreedoms, Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule
B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
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more truths demanding compliance and competing for primacy. And
the voices were louder and more urgently strident.
What about the New Pluralism? In the fifties, it began with a
burst of immigration adding to the existing collection of ethnic, racial,
linguistic, and religious groups; the beginning of human rights laws to
protect those groups from discrimination; and a general concern about
how to fit everybody in or, more pointedly, whether they would or should
fit in even if we could. Many of these minority groups added their voices
to those of the reawakened female ones in the sixties, and spent the
seventies bringing to the discussion table, among others, Francophones
outside Quebec, and disabled and Aboriginal people. And, by the
eighties, like the New Puritanism, lines had been drawn, sides taken, and
expectations forcefully articulated.
When the Charter was introduced to this "ism," rights truly
became capitalized, and people started capitalizing on their rights. This
rights frenzy produced an interesting phenomenon. As groups and the
individuals in them spoke with increasing confidence of their rights,
bolstered by the Charterand inspired by the Supreme Court of Canada,
more and more people outside these groups started asserting their right
to be free fiom pluralism. People we used to call "biased" now felt free
to raise insensitivity and intolerance to the level of a constitutionallyprotected right on the same plateau with the rights of minorities, or
women, or Aboriginal people. We started to think that all rights are
created equal, even the right to discriminate.
But not all rights are created equal. Some are more equal than
others. There is a difference between disadvantage and inconvenience.
We should not be embarrassed to admit that yelling "fire" in a crowded
theatre is fundamentally different from yelling "theatre" in a crowded
firehall; or that teaching Holocaust denial is different from teaching
about the Holocaust; or that promoting racist ideas is different from
promoting race. Intellectual pluralism does not, and cannot, mean the
right to expect that racism or sexism will be given the same deference as
tolerance.
And yet, this is what the New Pluralism seemed to tolerate: a
variety of groups and a variety of views about them, all of perceived
equal legitimacy and weight. In the zeal to interpret equality as
abolishing all distinctions by treating everyone and everything the same
way, we forgot that equality sometimes means taking differences very
much into account.
So, by the nineties, on the one hand we found different groups
trying to integrate their distinctiveness into the mainstream, and on the
other hand we found other groups trying to keep them, or their
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distinctiveness, out by setting homogenizing terms and conditions at the
gate. Just like the Old Pluralism, but multiplied and with louder and
more urgently strident voices.
We became too "them and us" about too many things and we
forgot how to listen. Too many people were claiming a monopoly on
truth and insisting on imposing their truths on everyone else. We lost
too much of our spirit of generosity and empathy, and grew far too
judgemental. We were in danger of losing the ability to disagree with
civility, and relied far too much on malicious monologues instead of
constructive criticism. We started replacing discussions with harangues,
debates with ridicule, and disagreement with sarcasm. We became
almost indifferent to compassion.
Part of the problem-a big part-was in how we were allowing
the premises behind civil liberties to checkmate the moves that human
rights wanted to make. There is a fundamental difference between the
rights we protect with civil liberties and those we promote with human
rights, but because it is a difference almost never articulated and even
more rarely explained, we have allowed the individualism of civil
liberties to trump the group realities of human rights.
We have to start at the beginning of the story. The human rights
story in North America, like many of our legal stories here, started in
England. The rampant religious, feudal, and monarchical repression in
17th century England inspired new political philosophies like those of
Hobbes, Locke, and eventually John Stuart Mill, philosophies protecting
individuals from having their freedoms interfered with by governments.
These were the theories of civil liberties that came to dominate the
rights discussion for the next three hundred years. They were also the
theories that journeyed across the Atlantic Ocean and found themselves
firmly planted in American soil. Watered by colonial discontent and the
persuasive polemics of pamphleteers like Adams, Paine, and Jefferson,
the roots took permanent hold in the American Revolution and
blossomed into the language of the Declarationof Independence.9 The
words confirmed that every "man" enjoyed the right to life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness and that government existed only to bring about
the best conditions for the preservation of those rights. Thus was born
the essence of social justice for Americans-the belief that each
individual, independent of every other individual and of government,
was free to pursue his version of happiness in his own way. It was an
atomized and atomizing political philosophy, and it venerated the
individual over the community. It was the right of every American to
9 (U.S.C.S. 1776).
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have the same right as every other American to be free from government
intervention. To be equal was to have this same right. No differences.
Thomas Jefferson's rhetoric in the Declaration of Independence
was noble and inspiring. But in offering an equal right to be free from
government, it thereby introduced egalitarian language to an unequal
society, since these resoundingly noble rights were available neither to
women nor to the slaves many of the framers of the Declaration of
Independence owned. This illusion of equality soon became what a
respected British historian designated as "the most vital and magnetic
forces in American life-a source of constantly renewed hope and
repeatedly embittered disappointment." 10
Regardless, however, of the historical realities, it is nonetheless
the case that the individualism at the core of the political philosophy of
rights articulated in the American constitution-ascribing equal civil,
political, and legal rights to every individual regardless of
differences-became America's most significant international export
and the exclusive rights barometer for countries in the Western world. It
was formal equality, it was Diceyan, it ignored group identities and
realities, and, indeed, regarded collective interests as subversive of true
rights. Concern for the rights of the individual monopolized the
remedial endeavours of the pursuers of justice all over the world.
It was not until 1945 that we came to the realization that having
chained ourselves to the pedestal of the individual, we had been ignoring
rights abuses of a fundamentally different and at least equally intolerable
kind-namely, the rights of individuals in different groups to retain their
different identities without fear of the loss of life, liberty or the pursuit
of happiness-what we have come to understand true equality means.
In our evolutionary relationship with rights theories, the drama of socioeconomic disparities during the Depression coaxed Western
governments into a newly activist and redistributive role, which the
public came to see as a necessary and reasonable limit on the historic
right to be free from government intervention.
But it was the Second World War that jolted us permanently
from our complacent belief that the only way to protect rights was to
keep government at a distance and to protect each individual
individually. What jolted us was the horrifying spectacle of group
destruction, a spectacle so far removed from what we thought were the
limits of rights violations in civilized societies, that we found our entire
vocabulary and remedial arsenal inadequate. We started talking about
10 J.R. Pole, The Pursuitof Equality in American History, 1st ed. (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1978) at 14.
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crimes against humanity, genocide, and international enforcement
mechanisms. We transcended civil rights with human rights, and shifted
focus from the civil libertarian remedies for individual harm to a search
for human rights remedies for collective harm. We were left with no
moral alternative but to acknowledge that individuals could be denied
rights not in spite of, but because of their differences, and started to
formulate ways to protect the rights of the group.
We had, in short, come to see the brutal role of discrimination.
It was a word we had never used, and could never use, when a concept
like civil rights prevailed, a concept that permitted no differences. So we
invented the term "human rights" to confront discrimination. We
clothed governments with the authority to devise remedies to prevent
arbitrary harm based on race or religion or gender or ethnicity, and we
respected government's new right to treat us differently to redress the
abuses our differences attracted. We saw how the neutral purpose of
civil libertarian individual rights had an unequal impact on the
opportunities of many individuals, and eventually we saw that all the
goodwill in the world could not protect us from our own prejudices and
stereotypes, or from restrictively designing systems and institutions
accordingly. So we blasted away at the conceptual wall that had kept us
from understanding the inhibiting role group differences played, and
extended the prospect of full socio-economic participation to women,
non-Whites, Aboriginal people, persons with disabilities, and those with
different sexual preferences. And, most significantly, we offered this full
participation and accommodation based on and notwithstanding group
differences.
Civil liberties gave us the universal right to be equally free from
an intrusive state, regardless of group identity; human rights gave us the
universal right to be equally free from discrimination based on group
identity. Human rights took over where civil liberties left off, but both
became crucial rights visions.
It was as if we had awoken from a three hundred year sleep,
looked around us, realized how limited our rights vision had become,
and, with stunning energy and enthusiasm, acknowledged more rights
and remedies in one generation than we had in all the centuries since the
Glorious Revolution in England in 1688-1689. In the United States, a
new rights approach based on difference and group diversity was
reflected in Brown v. Board of Education11 banning school segregation;

11 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act12 banning discrimination; and in
13
President Johnson's Executive Orders mandating affirmative action.
In Canada, bilingualism, multiculturalism, human rights commissions at
both government levels, and the promulgation of an inclusive Charterof
Rights and Freedoms were the policy reflections of this new antidiscrimination human rights approach we had come to embrace.
Having decided halfway through this century to endorse a
commitment to diversity as integral to our understanding of rights and
justice and community, why do we now appear to be abandoning that
commitment as the century closes?
The underlying concept of human rights-that no arbitrary
barrier should be allowed to stand between a person and his or her
aspirations-is not, it seems to me, a refutable proposition. One would
not have expected that the pursuit of the elimination of discrimination,
the heart of social justice, could ever trigger serious rebuttal. What,
after all, is the argument against equality? Inequality? Yet controversy
swirls intensely all around the diversity stage, and in creating so much
protection for social pluralism, we have also created a backlash.
Having witnessed the dazzling success of so many individuals in
so many of the groups we had previously excluded, we seem to have
concluded that the battle with discrimination has been won and that we
can, as victors, remove our human rights weapons from the social
battlefield. Having seen women elected, appointed, promoted, and
educated in droves; having seen the winds of progress blow away
segregation and apartheid; having permitted parades to demonstrate gay
and lesbian pride; having constructed hundreds of ramps for persons
with disabilities; and having invited Aboriginal people to participate in
constitutional discussions that we had started to protect other distinct
cultures, many were no longer persuaded that the diversity theory of
rights was still relevant, and sought to return to the simpler rights theory
in which everyone was treated the same. We became nostalgic for the
conformity of the civil liberties approach, and frightened by the way
human rights had dramatically altered every institution in society, from
the family to the legislature.
And this, I think, is at the heart of why we are marginalizing
human rights, because unlike civil liberties, which rearrange no social
relationships and only protect our political ones, human rights are a
direct assault on the status quo. They are inherently about change-in
12 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 2000c el
seq.).
13 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed Reg. 12,319 (1965), [1965] WL 7913 (Pres.).
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how we treat each other, not just in how government treats each of us.
And so in North America, we tend to yearn for the rights that are less
expensive, less confusing, and less frightening. The intellectual baskets
into which we place information once again take the shape of civil rights,
and we end by dismissively calling a differences-based approach reverse
discrimination, or political correctness, or an insult to the goodwill of the
majority and to the talents of minorities, or a violation of the merit
principle. Personal aspirations, we are now convinced, will be realized
by those who deserve them, and no one qualified will be turned away.
Civil rights trump human rights. Social and economic Darwinism trump
social and economic reality.
The fact is that, unlike the United States, we in Canada were
never concerned only with the rights of individuals. Our historical roots
involved a constitutional appreciation that two groups, the French and
the English, could remain distinct and unassimilated, and yet
theoretically of equal worth and entitlement. Unlike the United States,
whose individualism promoted assimilation, we in Canada have always
conceded that the right to integrate based on differences has as much
legal and political integrity as the right to assimilate. A melting pot if
necessary, but not necessarily a melting pot.
In Canada, we constitutionally guaranteed human rights in 1985
through section 15, the equality section of the Charter. Thirteen years
later, it has gone from being the newest kid on the constitutional block
to being called the neighbourhood bully. In less than a generation, this
remedy for discrimination has been seen to be sufficiently powerful that
people struggle urgently to find a remedyfi'om equality. How ironic that
"equality-seeker" has become a pejorative term, denoting someone
whose claim to fairness is a menace to the nation's economy and psyche.
The very people for whom equality was introduced-history's victims of
discrimination-find themselves suddenly accused of being the
victimizers. Equality, introduced to guarantee the equal right of
tolerance, has itself produced an intolerance the likes of which I have
not seen in the almost thirty years since I graduated from law school.
Somehow we have let those who have enough say, "enough is
enough," and to set the agenda while accusing everyone else of having
an "agenda," and leaving thousands wondering where the equality they
were promised is, and why so many people who already have it think the
rest of the country doesn't need it.
The reality is this: there are still built-in headwinds for those who
are different, who are thwarted in their conscious choices by stereotypes
unconsciously assigned, and who cannot be expected to understand why
the evolutionary knowledge we came to call human rights has suffered
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such swift Orwellian obliteration. We have forgotten the courage that
our outrage after the Second World War gave us to expand our
understanding and generosity, and have, I fear, been lulled into a false
sense of complacency by the formidable human rights successes that
resulted from that post-war courage.
We know from history that all rights, especially in their infancy,
are fragile and need nurturing. Democratic communities need their civil
liberties rigorously protected, but unless they also protect their human
rights, they do a disservice to justice. Of course we need the right to vote
and think and speak freely, but no less do we need the right to eat and
work and aspire freely. Before we relinquish the lessons of history to
those who fear its transforming vision, before we allow the civil
libertarian spirit to hold us in exclusive thrall, and before we are lured
into intellectual lassitude by the successes of the lucky and the tenacious,
we need to remember the rights lesson of the Second World War: the
enormity of its intolerance shocked us into a new understanding of
diversity; we should need no more shocks to retain that understanding.
This brings me to the human rights of women. Until 1968, when
the new Divorce Act gave men the right to claim support from their
wives, 14 nothing had been done that affected the perceptions of men and
women of their rights and obligations. Nothing had significantly
encroached on the traditions eulogized in 1847 by Tennyson in his poem
The Princess. As he put it:
Man for the field, and woman for the hearth:

Man for the sword, and for the needle she:
Man with the head, and woman with the heart:

Man to command, and woman to obey;
All else confusion.15

When I started practising law in 1972, I was not personally aware
that women suffered any particular disadvantage at the hands of their
communities or laws because I had never personally experienced any.
For me, getting from one year to another in school was a matter of
getting the marks; getting into law school was a matter of getting your
parents to support your professional aspirations; having children and
working was simply a matter of not being told you couldn't; and
practising litigation was a matter of making a living doing what you used
to get put in the corner in kindergarten for doing-talking too much. I
knew from the European novels I had read that there were relentless
14 S.C. 1967-68, c. 24, ss. 10-12.
15 A.L. Tennyson, The Princessand Maud (London: MacMillan, 1889) at 100,
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poverty and human despair, but I did not know from those books, or the
teachers who taught them to me, that poverty and despair were different
for women. I went through law school in the late sixties without hearing

the phrase "human rights;" even the social turbulence I watched in the
sixties outside the windows of my legal education spoke to liberation of a
universal, not a gender-specific kind. Except for my having been born in

Europe after the war to Jewish refugees who had spent four years in a
concentration camp, I would not personally have known of the
unspeakable cruelty of discrimination. And, if anything, being an
immigrant to Canada conditioned me not to think in terms of
entitlements based on differences, but in terms of opportunities based
on hard work. So I was raised as a person and as a lawyer who, while
conscious at some level that harm could come to those who were
different, preferred to think that those differences could be overcome
with effort.
Then I had clients and learned my most instructive lesson: our
own personal, fortuitously fortunate realities are not necessarily reality.
From exposure to my clients' realities in the early seventies, I learned
that you could lose your children if a judge didn't like the way you were
raising them, even if your husband wasn't raising them at all; I learned
that you could spend a lifetime helping your husband earn a living, then
get nothing from that living if you left him for the wrong reasons; I
learned that if you got the kids, you rarely got the money you needed to
raise them properly; I learned that if you went to work or if you stayed
home, someone was going to tell you that it wasn't what women were
supposed to do; and I learned that a separated woman's economic
security depended on the return and maintenance of her virginity. All of
this assuming she could find and pay for a lawyer who would help her
have the opportunity to have her rights examined in the courts. And all
of this practically irrelevant if you were a Black, Aboriginal, disabled,
gay, elderly, or a poor woman to whom the simple issue was often just
getting through the day.
Then, when thanks to the courageous generosity typical of then
Attorney-General Roy McMurtry, I was appointed at the age of twentynine, to the Family Court bench in 1976, seven months pregnant with
our second son Zachary, I saw that there was one court where those who
were poor were expected to go, and one for those who were not; I saw
children being removed from homes because their mothers were dating
the wrong man; I saw girls being removed from homes because their
fathers, who were not being removed because it would disrupt the
family, had sexually assaulted them; and I saw criminal assaults being
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handled in family rather than criminal court because the victims were
only wives, not strangers, and the object was to persuade, not punish.
I saw almost no child-care for women; unpaid household evening
work at the end of underpaid daytime employment, if they had paid jobs;
and a widening gap between the new crop of professional women and
the 95 per cent of women who were not.
Then it all seemed to explode, thanks largely to the
determination of women-and men-to blast away at the inequities in
the early and mid-seventies. As a result of these efforts in the midseventies, we saw a veritable tidal wave of reform, particularly in family
law, where the gender disparities were the starkest. Consider: We went
from separate property to equal property to pensions as property. We
went from dum casta clauses,16 to causal connections, to clean-break
theories and, finally, to Moge v. Moge.' 7 We went from women upon
marriage having to quit the paid labour force, to the overwhelming
majority of mothers being in the paid labour force.' 8 We went from no
divorce, to over a third of Canadian families divorcing,1 9 to the new
phenomenon in the United States of the possibility of children divorcing
their parents.2 0 We went from premarital virgins, to accessible birth
control, to the sexual revolution, to surrogacy and reproductive
technology. We abolished the unity between husband and wife,21
introduced the constructive trust, 2 2 extended it to common law
relationships, 2 3 defined common law relationships as spousal

16 From the Latin dum sola et casta vixerit (while she lives single and chaste); a means of
limiting the husband's responsibility to support his wife.
17 [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813. For useful discussions of the evolution of spousal support law, see C.J.
Rogerson, "The Causal Connection Test in Spousal Support Law" (1989) 8 Can. J. Fain. L. 95; and
C. Sheppard "Uncomfortable Victories and Unanswered Questions: Lessons from Moge" (1995) 12
Can. J. Fam. L. 283.
18 M. Eichler, Family Shifts: Families, Policies, and Gender Equality (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1997) at 35-36.
19 C.J. Richardson, "Divorce and Remarriage" in M. Baker, ed., Families:Changing Trends in
Canada,3d ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1995) 215 at 228-30.
20 See, for example, Gregory K v. Ralph K., No. Cl 92-5127, [1992] WL 551488 (Fla. Cir. Ct.)
(July 20, 1992).
21 See Family Law Reform Act, 1978, S.O. 1978 c, 2, s. 65.
22 See Rat hwell v. Rathwell, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 436.
23 See Pettkusv. Becker, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834.
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relationships, 24 and may have extended spousal relationships to same-sex
couples. 25
We moved from children being given to the least blameworthy
2
spouse 6 to children being given to the better parent. 2 7 We gave
children lawyers to speak for them,28 and we gave them the possibility of
being given to both parents jointly.29 We went from the "tender years"
doctrine 30 to the "best interests" principle. We gave children access to
the criminal courts to prevent their sexual exploitation from people they
had trusted, and we stopped caring whether their parents were
legitimate. 3 1
The seventies demanded equality for women, the eighties gave
them some, and the nineties started to blame social upheavals on the
roles we gave women in the seventies and the eighties. We
acknowledged that raising children was important, being a mother was
important, being a father was important, making a living was important,
and equality and the economy were beginning to demand that every
adult in the family be responsible for every responsibility in the family.
This made the confusion of genders and confusion of roles incredibly
confusing.
Just how profoundly we appear to have jolted the status quo is
painfully apparent in the insults and epithets we too often hear instead
of analysis. Name-calling, in my view, is no substitute for thinking. It is
hardly constructive to suggest, for example, that every decision that
favours a woman reflects a feminist bias, any more than it is helpful to
suggest that every time a man is successful it is reflective of male
chauvinism. It takes no courage to accuse someone of political
correctness or special interest politics. And what is a "special interest"

24 See Family Law Act, 1986, S.O. 1986, c. 4, s. 29.
25 See Rosenberg v. Canada (A.G.) (1998), 38 O.R. (3d) 577 (C.A.); and M. v. H. (1996), 142
D.L.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. C.A.) (appeal heard and reserved by the Supreme Court of Canada, 18 March

1998).
26 See, for example, Talsky v. Talsky, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 292, rev'g [1973] 3 O.R. 827 (C.A.).
27 See Children'sLaw Refonn Amendment Act, 1982, S.O. 1982, c. 20.
28 See, for example, Wakaluk v. Wakaluk (1976), 25 R.F.L. 19 (Sask. C.A.); and Re: W(1980),
27 O.R. (2d) 314 (Fam. Ct.).
29 See, for example, Madam Justice Wilson's dissent in Kruger v. Kruger (1979), 25 O.R. (2d)

673 (C.A.); and Bakery. Baker (1979), 23 O.R. (2d) 391 (C.A.).
30 See Bell v. Bell, [1955] O.W.N. 341 at 344 (C.A.).
31 See Children'sLaw Reform Act, 1977, S.O. 1977, c. 41, ss. 1, 18-24.
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group anyway if not just a shorthand way of presumptively dismissing
some group's arguably legitimate concerns?
This brings us to feminism. We read about poststructural
feminists, political feminists, different-voice feminists, careerist
feminists, liberal feminists, eco-feminists, personal development
feminists, and New Age feminists. But we also read about Camille
Paglia, who refuses to set foot in the feminist cathedral and sneeringly
disdains its catechism.
Women seem to have gone from worrying in the seventies about
whether feminists could help achieve economic, social, and political
equality, to worrying in the nineties about whether they could do all that
and still wear lipstick. Yesterday's query: Can you be a thinking woman
and not be a feminist? Today's query: Can you be a thinking feminist
and still have plastic surgery?
Or so it seems from reading the popular press. I think it's fair to
say that feminists have lost the public relations war and won the public's
ingratitude. Articles about women's issues, when they do appear, tend
to be about how young women feel no need for feminism, how the
women's movement has unfairly appropriated domestic violence, how
women get custody too often, how women lie in sexual assault cases, or
how women have waged a gender war and the battlefield is littered with
wounded children and husbands.
And then there are all those revealing comments one hears at
the nation's dinner tables: "Why can't they get their act together?;"
"Who does she think she is?;" "My wife/colleague/daughter-in-law is
perfectly happy with the way things are;" "Do you think they'll want to
work for her?;" "Won't she make waves?;" "What will the clients say?;"
"What will her husband say?;" "Why doesn't she have a husband?;" "No
wonder she doesn't have a husband;" "If I made it, anyone can with a
little hard work;" "She's gone too far too fast;" or "She would never
have gotten there if she weren't a woman."
For reasons I can explain but do not understand, the word
feminist seems to be the grown-up equivalent to saying "Boo!," the
Poltergeist of modern discourse. I had always understood that feminism
was that branch of human rights that concentrated on women to ensure
that no arbitrary barrier stood between them and their aspirations. It
means adding women to where they had not been before; it does not
mean kicking out the former occupants. It means ensuring access to
amenities that would, or should, have been available but for the
existence of discrimination. It means making the competition fairer.
That, it strikes me, is not a controversial proposition. So why is the
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name for it? What is so scary about getting rid of discrimination against
women?
It is a staggeringly insulting assumption to suggest to women and
minorities that their increased participation is an invitation to violate the
merit principle, rather than an attempt to acknowledge it. It seems to
me to be premature to talk about how women and minorities are
destroying the merit principle unless we are satisfied that that is what we
have had up until now.
Making the competition fairer may change the composition of
who gets the rewards, but if some of the new people getting rewards are
people who ought to have been among the old ones, the system is not
being unfair, it is catching up.
The philosophy of human rights represents an attempt to add
layers of tolerance. It is a philosophy that is the opposite of intolerance,
not its tautology. It wants to expand rights for everyone by including
women and minorities. Adding layers of tolerance is good for everyone,
not just women and minorities. Preventing tolerance is bad for
everyone, especially women and minorities. It is not, in my view, a bias to
understand the systemic discrimination of women and minorities; it
might be a bias not to. Neutrality is not compromised by treating some
social differences differently; ignoring them might be.
There has undoubtedly been remarkable progress this
generation. Since graduating from law school in 1970 with five other
women, I've seen women graduate as half their law school class; three
women on the Supreme Court of Canada; two women become federal
ministers of justice, one of them briefly becoming prime minister; a
woman as clerk of the Privy Council; many women journalists; dozens of
women legislators and senators; hundreds of women academics and
artists; and thousands of women in business and the public service. We
have changed the support, property, and custody laws; expanded human
rights laws; constitutionalized equality rights; and brought sexual abuse
and orientation out of the closet. There are many more fathers
committed to spending time as fathers; many more husbands committed
to spending time as partners; and many more men committed to
spending time as mentors. We have come a long way in this generation
and should feel no small amount of pride and wonder at the distances
traveled.
But for every woman in the thousands whose glass ceiling has
been melted, shattered, or raised, there are women in the millions who
see a glass ceiling as just one more household object to polish. There is
still a huge gap between what the public thinks has happened to
women-because several thousand have had the luck, guts, finances,
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friends, encouragement, or supportive partners to break barriers-and
what is really happening for the majority of them.
Too many women are struggling in the shadows cast by the
public's fixation with the credentialed, successful women, trying to get
some help, and desperate to understand how so few at the top can take
so much attention away from so many nearer the economic middle and
bottom. Most women still earn less than they should, get hired or
promoted less than they should, have less child care than they should,
experience or worry about assaults more than they should, and endure
more stress than they should. The only thing they have more of than
men is poverty. They may not be women we know personally, but they
are out there and they are hurting.
Those women, and especially minority, disabled, elderly and
Aboriginal women who suffer double jeopardy, are waiting for human
rights to hit them, for the rhetoric of equality they can hear to turn into
the reality of equality they can live. They expect that men and women
who have been lucky enough to learn how to speak and live equality will
use those strengths to articulate and generate the same equality for
others. They expect, and they are constitutionally right to expect, that
both of this country's official genders should be fluently equal.
I remain tenaciously optimistic that the generosity of a
generation ago will recover from the sclerosis it is experiencing as the
century closes. And I remain so because I have confidence that a sense
of justice is so firmly embedded in our best sense of who we are and
what we want to be as a cointry, that not for long will it be permitted to
languish behind less tolerant policy priorities. This generation has
witnessed dramatic social reforms. Perhaps this rest period was
inevitable. But so too is the next generation's reawakened conscience,
assisted, I expect, by many of you now in law school who will carry into
your future that same passion for justice that fuelled Barbara
Betcherman's vision.
And so, at last, to Barbara Betcherman. I have met many
extraordinary people in my life, but I have never met anyone quite like
Barbara. She was a true original. Brilliant, beautiful, funny, irreverent,
loyal, loving, fearless, and passionate. She was on the cutting edge and
she was way ahead of it. She never did anything except exceptionally.
She was top of her class at Osgoode, managed the Book Cellar
Bookstore, articled with the Morand Commission on Public Brutality,
helped found the Toronto Rape Crisis Centre, directed the research at
the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's Ombudsman program,
practised law, worked as a federal prosecutor, married an outstanding
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young criminal lawyer, and wrote her first novel, all before she was
thirty.
That was the age at which she decided to become a full-time
writer. Having satisfied herself and the rest of us that she could master
law, she moved into her next life as a novelist which, it won't surprise you
to learn, she also mastered. I'll never forget reading her first book,
Suspicions,32 and being utterly swept away by her talent. She had made
up her mind to write a bestseller and she did, first time up. Over half a
million copies printed, a three-book contract from Putnam, and a sixfigure advance. The book was a thriller-smart, fast-paced, unusually
literate, and infused with spirited determination. Just like Barbara.
She moved to Guadalajara to live the writer's life. Her hips were
crushed in a devastating car accident on a hot, deserted road in Mexico,
leaving her without medical attention for hours. She, however, refused
to be crushed by what would overwhelm most people. She came back to
Canada briefly to restore her body, her mind being tenaciously
unharmed by the trauma, then moved to a wonderful little house on the
beach in Malibu near Alice's Restaurant, where she reconstructed her
life as a novelist and scriptwriter, dazzling her new friends as she had her
old ones with that magic personality.
Fifteen years ago, she was struck by a car in front of her home on
the Pacific Coast Highway. This year would have been her fiftieth
birthday. Losing her passionate commitment left a shocking void, and
the pain left us breathless. It was inconceivable that this force of nature
could ever be stopped, could ever be made to loosen her grip on the
spirit of our times.
Well, she wasn't stopped. Her contribution goes on and on,
through the memory of her relentless acuity, through the memory of her
irresistible audacity, and through the memory of one of the most
devastatingly mischievous senses of humour ever to hit the women's
movement.
She came by it all honestly. The remarkable parents she revered
are the living answer to the question: What made Barbara Betcherman
the charismatically brave humanist she was? Her mother, Lita-Rose, got
her Ph.D. in history in her forties, wrote ground-breaking history books,
was the first director of the Ontario Women's Directorate, and is one of
this country's premier labour arbitrators. Her father, Irving, got his
Ph.D. in engineering in his twenties, ran a successful steel business until
he decided, in his fifties, to follow his daughter's example and get a law
degree from this law school. How often she talked abut how important
32 See B. Betcherman, Suspicions (New York: Putnam, 1980).
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they were to her, how much she admired their generosity, wisdom, and
tolerance, and how much she loved the gentleness of their strong
character. All four of the Betcherman children-Barbara and the three
wonderful brothers she adored-cherished their parents and each other,
and relished the intellectual and emotional richness of their marvellous

home.
Yesterday was the Betchermans' fifty-second wedding
anniversary. This lecture is my present to them, along with my love and
gratitude for a generation of friendship.
I am deeply grateful to them for the honour of linking me
publicly with their magnificent family, and I thank them particularly for
permitting me to pay tribute to one of this generation's most remarkable
women, their daughter, the indomitable and the inimitable Barbara
Betcherman.

